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AN ANALYSIS OF SUPPLY CONTRACTS IN THE LIVESTOCK MARKETS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 
Doussou Traore, M.S. 
University of Nebraska, 2010 
Advisor: Jeffrey S. Royer 
In this report, we discuss market relations in the cattle and beef sector of the United 
States by setting up a sequence of optimization decisions taken by cattle feeders (producers, 
sellers) and meat packers (processors, buyers) to solve for the equilibrium supply and demand 
proportions in the contract market in a first stage given the respective degrees of risk aversion 
for the representative producer and processor. Subsequently we derive the impacts of contracts, 
namely impacts on the spot market price and the processors’ ability to exercise oligopsony 
power, in a second stage. Using a model for a fixed-price contract, the equilibrium proportions 
allocated to the contract market by producers and processors correspond to those in Buccola’s 
model of decisions under risk (1981). This model is extended to solve for the equilibrium in the 
case of unequal bargaining power between the producer and processor. The residual supply 
function is used to derive the spot market price through a conjectural variation model and we 
refer to the prominent Lerner Index for the downstream processor’s oligopsony power. We find 
that the use of fixed-priced contracts for risk averse producers and processors can serve to 
reduce the spot market price offered for cattle given the assumption that the residual supply 
becomes more inelastic. Hence, the processor enjoys higher oligopsony power in the spot 
market.  
We run simulations in a spreadsheet model to derive further insights about key 
parameters, including the risk aversion coefficients, the spot market price variance, the 
coefficient of expectations, and the bargaining power weights in the contract market. We 
observe that when the spot market price is expected to be higher than the equilibrium fixed 
contract price, increases in the producer’s coefficient of risk aversion cause their optimal share 
of cattle marketed through contracts to increase and hence it contributes to a higher spot market 
price. On the other hand, when the expected market price is lower than the equilibrium 
contracted price, increases in the producer’s coefficient of risk aversion decreases the producers’ 
optimal share of cattle marketed through contracts relative to the processors’ and hence 
contributes to lower spot market prices. These two results are due to the fact that increasing risk 
aversion decreases the sensitivity with which optimal portfolios react to changes in the price 
parameters. By simulating increasing (decreasing) spot market price variance, we observe the 
equilibrium contracted proportions to increase (decrease) accordingly. In turn, this causes a 
lower (higher) spot market price. The simulations on the degree of the processors’ bargaining 
power in the contract market show that increases in the processors’ bargaining power induces 
higher demand for contracts by processors and lower supply of contracts by producers. This 
results in a decline in the contract price and an increase in the spot market price.  
Finally, a brief exercise in a dynamic decision making reveals that a producer will 
always choose to contract out a proportion of their cattle as long as they are less than 50% 
certain that, on average, future market prices will be slightly lower than the offered contract 
price. 
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Glossary of Symbols 
Variable Description 
α Coefficient of expectations; with subscrip “s” for sellers and 
“b” for buyers 
A Total quantity bought for processing 
β Weighted average conjectural variation for processors 
γ Processor’s risk aversion coefficient  
δ Small but significant value 
ε Elasticity of supply 
εo Elasticity of residual supply 
Em Expected market price of cattle 
Ebk Equilibrium contract price of cattle 
Λ Producer’s risk aversion coefficient 
θ Processor bargaining power in the contract market, 0<θ<1 
Φ Elasticity adjustment constant 
Ν Conjecture of processors 
πs Seller’s profit 
πb Buyer’s profit 
C Per-unit production costs 
D Per-unit processing costs 
F Per-unit fixed costs of production 
G Per-unit fixed costs of processing 
kB Per-unit price in the contract market; as a function of the per-
unit variable cost (B) of production and some positive factor (k) 
L Composite Lerner’s Index for oligopsony power 
m Marketing input for processing 
M Spot market price 
n Number of processors with n= 1, 2, …, j, i  
N Number of producers 
pt Probability at time t that EbkE tm >  
R Per-unit price of final output 
S Variance term 
s Supply shift constant 
t Number of periods in fixed-price marketing agreement with 
t=1, 2, …, T  
U Exponential utility function 
V Proportion of cattle sold through contract 
W Proportion of cattle purchased through contract 
X Total quantity produced for sale 
Y Certainty equivalent of risky prospects for the buyer 
Z Certainty equivalent of risky prospects for the seller 
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Chapter I. Introduction 
 
Overview of the United States’ livestock industry and alternative marketing 
arrangements (AMAs) 
 
This paper discusses changes in the market relations in the cattle and beef sector of the 
United States. The elements contributing to these changes are increases in the size of farms, changes 
in production technologies, increased enterprise specialization, and tighter vertical coordination 
between stages of production. We specifically address the impacts contractual coordination may 
have on the markets for cattle feeders and meat packers given their idiosyncratic characteristics. For 
this purpose, we use a model for contracts to examine the spot market conditions for feeders and 
packers; notwithstanding, the implications are also relevant for other agricultural raw product 
markets.  
The production and marketing of meat include multiple stages, as per Figure 1 below. At the 
farm level, cattle are produced on single species farms and usually at multiple locations including 
breeding operations, feeder operations, and finishing operations (USDA, 2005; MacDonald and 
McBride, 2009). These farms have become much larger and specialized recently. Finished livestock 
are delivered for slaughter to specialized establishments with single species and in some cases 
multiple species. Once livestock are slaughtered, carcasses and cuts from animals may be further 
processed at processing establishments before being delivered to consumers, either through retailers 
or at restaurants and food service establishments.  
4 
 
Figure 1: Overview of the Meat Production Industries from Farm to Final Consumer 
 
Source: USDA, 2005.
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The linkages between each of the illustrated stages are achieved through schemes that have 
evolved throughout the history of the industry. These schemes generally agree with the belief that 
an economic organization is designed to minimize the transaction costs of doing business between 
parties. Economizing on transaction costs is seen as the primary motivation for adopting different 
structures governing the relationship between parties of a transaction (Williamson, 1979; Wu, 1992; 
Ward, 1997; USDA, 2005; Kvaloy and Tveteras, 2008). As the transactions between two parties 
become recurrent and involve high uncertainties and high levels of specific investment, as is the 
case for livestock, the two will have strong incentives to integrate or to coordinate to some degree. 
Beldon (1992) explains that the ineffectiveness of traditional markets in communicating signals to 
producers and the inconsistency of producer response have contributed to the increasing use of other 
institutional models to coordinate production, marketing, and processing in many industries.  
Alternative marketing arrangements (AMAs) are increasingly applied in the livestock 
industry. AMAs refer to all possible alternatives to the “cash” or “spot” market. They are methods 
through which livestock and meat are transferred through successive stages of production; the AMA 
specifies the pricing method and the terms of delivery. AMAs can also refer to captive supplies, 
which by definition are slaughter livestock that are committed to a specific buyer two weeks or 
more in advance of slaughter. These practices are undertaken in the industry for efficiency purposes 
including financial risk management, diffusion of innovations, quantity and quality assurance, 
information, and traceback capabilities. Documented benefits to cattle feeders include price risk 
management, access to markets and to financing, opportunities for carcass quality premiums, and 
reduced marketing costs (Shroeder et al, 1993; USDA, 2005; Taylor et al, 2007). Packers’ benefits 
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include secured cattle slaughter volume to match capacity, more control over the type and quality of 
cattle, and reduced procurement and information costs. Cash or spot market transactions refer to 
transactions that occur immediately. They serve an important purpose in the industry, particularly 
for small producers and small packers.  They also provide benefits to market users because the 
transaction terms such as prices, location, and observable quality characteristics are readily 
available and easy to record. 
From October 2002 through March 2005, the use of AMAs, including packer ownership, 
was estimated at 38% of the fed cattle volume destined to beef production, 89% of the finish hog 
volume, and 44% of the fed lamb volume sold to packers (USDA, 2005). However, there is a high 
weekly variability in procurement method both in percentage terms and in absolute volume as per 
Ward (2005). Between 2001 and 2003, for any given week, the percentage allocation for cattle to 
cash market was as low as 24.5% and as high as 76.9%. In the same period, the combination of 
supply contracts and marketing agreements ranged between 22.1-64.8%, forward contracts were 
between 0.2-9.4%, and packer ownership was between 2.6-13.6%. 
 Beef producers have increased the level of vertical coordination through marketing 
agreements, alliances, retained ownership, part-ownership, and partnerships with downstream 
processors. Likewise, downstream processors have achieved coordination through part-ownership, 
partnerships, and profit sharing with other downstream processors, upstream producers, and cow-
calf operations. There are also alliances with some retailers and food service companies. Unlike the 
case with other meats such as poultry, due to the combination of large investment requirements 
(land) and complex genetic specificities (wide base and long cycle), vertical coordination in the beef 
production system is typically not done by fully combining stages (vertical integration). When full 
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integration occurs in the sector, the enterprises tend to operate as separate profit centers. For 
instance, the largest investors in National Beef Packing also have cow-calf operations, but the 
business entities are not combined (USDA, 2005).  
AMAs include arrangements such as forward contracts, marketing agreements, procurement 
or marketing contracts, production contracts, packer ownership, custom feeding, and custom 
slaughter. Marketing agreements are the most commonly used AMA in cattle procurement and 
marketing. A typical marketing agreement contract runs from four to seven years and stipulates the 
producer compensation scheme, risk sharing provisions, minimum number of fed cattle to be 
supplied in each period, and minimum standards for cattle quality (Hayenga et al. 1996). Spot 
market examples include auction barn sales; video or electronic auction sales; sales through order 
buyers, dealers, and brokers; and direct trades (or private treaty sales). 
The increased use of AMAs raises a number of questions about their motivations and their 
effects on economic efficiency and on the distribution of the benefits and costs between the 
different actors of the supply chain. The main actors along the beef supply chain are cattle feeders 
(farm level), meat packers (wholesale), retailers and consumers.  
Purpose of the study 
Welfare impacts of the practice of AMAs are of concern.  As Rogers and Sexton (1994) 
observe, many agricultural markets have oligopsonistic characteristics, in which a small number of 
downstream processors exercise market power over a much larger number upstream producers.  
Some industry observers (USDA, 1996a and 1996b) fear that increased vertical integration, in any 
degree, in the livestock industry has the potential to increase the oligopsony power of the already 
highly concentrated downstream meat packers. Contractual agreements are feared to be able to 
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allow for strategic behavior, interfere with price discovery, result in unequal access to markets and 
market information, and can be used by large packers to deter entry. For instance, large processors 
are able to encourage producers to enter into a production contract by offering attractive terms at 
first. Processors could then exploit the subsequently gained market power to impose less favorable 
contracts in the next period in an unequal bargaining process. 
Moreover, in 2002 Taylor observed a long-term downward trend of the monthly real retail 
value of beef since 1980 along with a declining trend in the real price of fed cattle; all while 
between 1993 and 2002, the farm-to-wholesale price spread has amplified by 50%. Taylor, in his 
testimony to the U.S. Senate on the hearing on a proposed ban on packer ownership of livestock and 
USDA’s enforcement of the Packers and Stockyards Act, defends that the exertion of monopsony or 
oligopsony power is the only plausible explanation for the strong upward trend in the farm-to-
wholesale spread for beef; and holds the following position on the issue:  
The implication of preferential treatment of some of the contractors (cattle 
feeders) by packers is that the aggregate supply curve for slaughter is shifted 
outward, lowering cash market price and thereby harming independent producers. 
The preferential treatment of some producers may allow them to maintain 
profitability even with lower cash prices. However, independents will be 
eventually forced out of the business due to sustained losses. If the beef and pork 
sectors evolve like the poultry industry, we can expect that once the independents 
are gone, the premia for the remaining cattle feeders will evaporate, leaving them 
at the mercy of the monopsonistic or oligopsonistic contractors (pp.8).  
 
The issue of vertical integration in agricultural markets is an exceptionally important 
one; a structured study is hence necessary to better understand different practices and to explain 
the implications for all parties involved. We intend to evaluate the process where risk averse 
feeders and packers enter into contracts for the sale and purchase of cattle within an 
oligopsonistic setting. Many attributes for heterogeneity can characterize such decision making. 
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In this study, we evaluate feeders and packers in terms of their respective degrees of risk 
aversion. The degree of risk aversion is a key attribute as it can explain why the parties to a 
transaction are more or less willing to lock in a predetermined price and quantity now as 
opposed to waiting to see if the market would or would not turn out in their favor later after all 
other required investments have been made. It is believed that output is likely to be more 
restricted under contracts than under other means of exchange; and hence, it is misleading to use 
a vertical integration model as a proxy for a contract model in assessing any impacts (Wu, 
1992). Hence, we use a model for contracts. 
The present analysis should provide useful information to cattle feeders, meat packers, 
consumers, and public policy makers.  A demonstration of what can be expected in the market 
with increased contracting and decreasing open market transactions, as well as an assessment of 
the underlying reasons, is informative for both producers and processors who are considering 
whether to enter into contracts or to transact in the spot market. Generally, information about the 
effects of contract coordination on the market structure and thereby on social welfare is valuable 
to public policy makers in determining whether to adopt policies that support or discourage the 
use of contracts in the procurement of beef-cattle. Additionally, before taking a stand to promote 
or to oppose the use of contractual agreements in the beef sector, it is important to understand 
the different economic incentives and/or disincentives for both producers and processors to use 
different marketing forms and the consequences of limiting such options in the market. Hence, 
the purpose here is to provide a structured framework and to take a deeper look into the 
economics of contractual agreements such as ex ante risk mitigation purposes and to highlight 
the possible consequences ex post on the spot market and market power.  
10 
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Chapter II. Literature Review  
The literature review is in two parts. The first part discusses evidence of oligopsonistic 
behavior in the livestock industry. An oligopsonistic market is a market in which there are 
only a few large buyers for a product or service. This allows the buyers to exert a great deal of 
control over the sellers and can effectively drive down prices. Chen and Lent (1994) looked at 
the effects of an agricultural product supply shift on the equilibrium prices and quantities of 
farm products purchased by food processors, and on profits of food processors. In this paper, a 
similar framework is used for deriving the Lerner Index of oligopsony power.  
Rogers and Sexton (1994) identified several characteristics of first-handler agricultural 
markets that leave them susceptible to buyer power when buyer concentration increases. These 
characteristics are the bulky and perishable nature of the product that is costly to transport, the 
processors’ demand for specialized farm products, and the inelastic supply at the farm level due 
to high sunk assets. They limit spatial competition among buyers, and higher industry 
concentration together with inelastic farm supply present compelling structural evidence of 
buyer market power.  
Azzam and Schroeter (1995) analyzed the tradeoff between regional oligopsony power 
and cost efficiency resulting from consolidation in a food processing industry. The model was 
used to calculate the cost reductions necessary to offset the anti-competitive effects of market 
power and to compare them to actual cost savings achieved through plant scale or multi-plant 
operating economies. They found the estimated cost savings necessary to neutralize the anti-
competitive effects of consolidation in beef packing were about half the actual cost savings of 
scale economies. 
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Furthermore, in 1997, Azzam separated the market power effect of concentration from 
its cost-efficiency effect. Using an example of the U.S. beef-packing industry, an empirical 
analysis was conducted on the model. The findings support the existence of both oligopsonistic 
market power and slaughter-cost efficiency in the industry. However, the cost efficiency effect 
outweighs the market-power effect.  
Subsequently, Azzam and Rosenbaum (2001) looked at the link between market 
concentration and price. In the paper, they developed a theoretical model to address how much 
of the link can be attributed to market power and how much to efficiency. Applied to the U.S. 
Portland cement industry, the model indicated that both impacts matter. In relative terms, 
however, the market power effect was twice as large as the efficiency effect. The differences in 
results mainly came from differences in the industries in question and the timing of the studies. 
In the case of livestock, the period leading up to late 1990s was characterized by increasing 
consolidations downstream. However, of concern is that more recently, the exertion of 
monopoly and monopsony power has negated the efficiency gains in meatpacking and retailing 
that occurred in the 1980s (Taylor, 2002).  
This second part of literature review discusses work conducted on vertical integration 
and contractual coordination in livestock marketing and the revealed open market impacts. The 
use of different marketing methods has a seasonal component and can vary widely from plant to 
plant and week to week (Ward, 2000). The market power incentives for processors and packers 
to integrate backward and the effect of such integration on prices, output, and economic welfare 
have been analyzed using a model developed by Martin Perry in 1978.  Perry provided a 
workable concept of backward integration. The traditional measure of backward integration by a 
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firm has been the ratio of its own production of an intermediate input to its total employment of 
the input. Such a measure defines vertical integration as the resolution of the firm’s production 
decisions and is empirically useful. Instead, Perry proposed a measure of backward integration 
which is independent of the production decisions made by an imperfectly competitive buyer. 
This measure allowed the evaluation of the impact of backward integration on a monopsonist’s 
choices of input production and employment. In the model, a monopsony firm purchases an 
input it uses in producing a final product, which it sells to consumers in a competitive market.  
In addition to purchasing input, the firm can produce the input by integrating backward and 
acquiring the production capacity of some of the input producers.  The optimal degree of 
integration, as defined by the proportion of the input production capacity acquired by the 
monopsonist, depends on its acquisition costs.   
Perry demonstrated that for several reasonable specifications of the acquisition costs, the 
monopsonist will have an incentive to integrate backward, at least partially.  He also 
demonstrated that increased backward integration by the monopsonist will generally produce an 
increase in input employment, resulting in increased output and a lower final product price for 
consumers.  Total economic welfare would be improved, but the price received by the remaining 
independent input producers would decrease. According to Perry, vertical integration, and 
presumably vertical coordination, in response to transactional economies can be expected to 
increase economic welfare.  On the other hand, vertical integration in reaction to market 
imperfections may either increase or decrease economic welfare, thereby raising public policy 
questions regarding the desirability of integration. 
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Azzam and Wellman (1992) applied Perry’s model to examine the expected effects of 
increased backward integration by packers in the slaughter hog industry.  Assuming constant 
elasticity forms for the derived demand for hogs and the hog supply function, they simulated the 
effects of increasing the degree of vertical integration by a monopsonistic packer on hog 
slaughter and variables related to independent producers for a range of elasticities of demand 
and supply.  Their results demonstrated that increased integration can be expected to increase 
overall pork production and lower consumer prices while decreasing hog production by 
independent producers and lowering both the price they receive for hogs and their net earnings.  
A limitation of monopsony models is that they cannot be used to analyze the market 
power incentives to integrate backward under oligopsonistic conditions that characterize many 
agricultural markets (Rogers and Sexton, 1994). Azzam (1998) extends a one-product two-input 
model to consider a profit maximizing and partially integrated oligopsonistic industry. The 
result shows that although the empirical relationship between captive supplies and the price 
received by independent producers is negative, it may or may not be attributed to 
noncompetitive conduct.  
Azzam’s paper did not offer an explicit motivation for exclusive contracts. Rather, an 
equilibrium displacement model of an industry was used to derive an expression for the 
elasticity of the open market price with respect to the degree of integration of the processors. 
The elasticity of the open-market price with respect to the degree of vertical integration was 
evaluated by considering shocks in the output demand, in the respective supplies of the open-
market farm input, captive supplies, or the market input. The resulting expression conveyed that 
the response of the open market price to changes in the degree of vertical integration is 
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determined in a complex way by the respective fractions of expenditures on the farm input 
accounted for by open-market and captive supplies; by the respective fractions of total 
expenditures on all inputs accounted for by non-captive supplies, captive supplies, and 
marketing input; by the elasticity of substitution between the farm input and the marketing 
inputs; by the supply elasticity of the farm input from external sources; by the open-market 
power; and by the extent to which that market power is affected by increasing levels of captive 
supplies relative to total slaughter. The sign of the elasticity was unambiguously negative under 
circumstances described in the paper. The sign remained negative whether vertical integration 
did or did not worsen conduct, or whether conduct was competitive or noncompetitive.  
Azzam’s results suggest that noncompetitive conduct is not a necessary condition for the 
inverse relationship between the open-market price and the degree of vertical integration. 
Azzam concludes by stating that further research, such as studying the market comparative 
statics under alternative motives for backward integration and alternative market structures and 
distinguishing between their idiosyncratic predictions, could be an improvement over his model. 
Another improvement would come through considering a contract price that is not equivalent to 
the marginal cost of captive supply, as assumed in the present paper.  
The objective in Schroeter and Azzam’s 1999 econometric analysis of 1995/96 fed cattle 
procurement in the Texas panhandle was to get a clear understanding of the nature of the short-
run relationship between packers and feeders to determine whether the capability exists for one 
party to use short-run strategies as a means of manipulating spot market prices to the detriment 
of another party. They looked at the week-to-week relationship between the delivery volumes of 
cattle procured by non-cash methods and the spot market price of fed cattle. The regression 
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results, at the plant level and at the regional level, uncover a stable and robust empirical 
regularity that the use of non-cash procurement methods is negatively correlated with the spot 
market prices. They add further insights stating that for both packers and feeders are able to 
inter-temporally shift non-cash cattle deliveries in response to economic incentives dictated by 
changing market conditions. For instance, other things equal, deliveries of marketing agreement 
and forward contract cattle will tend to be “high”  when the ex ante forecast of the spot market 
price is “low.”   
Love and Burton (1999) developed a strategic rationale for spatial backward integration 
of a dominant firm and a competitive fringe. A partially backward integrated dominant firm can 
increase profit through efficiency gains in production and through a lower price for externally 
purchased input. The optimal degree of backward integration results when the dominant firm’s 
profit from exerting monopsony market power in the external spot market equals its profits from 
producing raw input internally, less the incremental cost of acquiring internal raw input 
production capacity. The open market price may rise or fall depending upon how integration 
affects the residual elasticity of raw product supply.  
Zhang and Sexton (2000) studied an interesting empirical regularity occurring in 
markets featuring contract and spot exchanges: the spot price is inversely related to the 
incidence of contract use in the market. They used a spatial model and a non-cooperative game 
approach to develop a duopsony (two buyers) within spatial markets to show that exclusive 
contracts can be used in some market settings to diminish competition between buyers. The 
motivation for the use of captive supply contracts in this case was to influence the cash market 
price; the implications for competition are therefore much different from prior analyses. The 
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most general model involved processors deciding first on the geographic areas in which to offer 
captive supply contracts and then in the spot market to procure supply not committed through 
captive contracts. As the model was not tractable in its full generality, the authors focused on 
two simplified versions of the more general model. The first version was an asymmetric model 
in which firm A offers captive supply contracts but firm B does not. In the second version, both 
firms may offer captive supply contracts, and therefore compete in both the contract and spot 
markets.  
They concluded that captive supplies, in settings where the spatial dimension is 
important (costly transportation), represent geographic buffers that reduce competition among 
processors. The model predicted that, all things equal, if captive supply contracts are being used 
to influence the cash price, those feedlots with captive supply contracts would be located at 
greater distances from the packer than their cash market suppliers. This is due to the potential of 
boundary jumping that could occur. The model also predicted that the producer price in the 
captive supply contracts must be at least as high as the cash market price, holding other factors 
such as quality constant.  
Furthermore, they concluded that captive supply contracts will be more prevalent in the 
more concentrated procurement areas because they are rendered ineffective by boundary 
jumping in markets when competition (as measured by the transportation cost) is sufficiently 
intense. Their conclusions are important because prior studies have tended to emphasize 
explanations that do not involve market manipulations. Contracts may be motivated by any of 
several efficiency considerations, addressing problems of adverse selection and/or moral hazard 
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among producers, as mentioned in the introduction of this paper. Nonetheless, the analysis 
shows captive supplies may influence the cash market price to producers’ detriment.  
As Taylor (2002) mentioned, there is substantive theoretical literature that established 
conditions under which either contracting or vertical integration may be privately preferred yet 
socially inefficient, even in the absence of externalities. It is important to evaluate the expanding 
use of contracts in agricultural markets. This review of the literature emphasizes that concerns 
are greatest in markets that feature high buyer concentration and high transportation costs 
(especially when relative to the net value of the finished product). With the exception of Zhang 
and Sexton (2000), the papers reviewed model vertical integration as a proxy for all forms of 
vertical coordination through contracts even though output is likely to be more restricted under 
contracts. A formal model for supply contracts specific to the cattle and beef sector is indeed an 
important contribution to the literature. 
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Chapter III. Model 
In this section, the purpose is to set up a sequence of optimization decisions taken by 
both cattle feeders (producers or sellers) and meat packers (processors or buyers) to solve for the 
equilibrium supply and demand in the contract market and to derive the subsequent spot market 
outcomes given the producers and processors’ respective degrees of risk aversion.  
The set up the model depicts cattle marketing consists of periodic transactions. In each 
period, there are two sequential stages. In the first stage, the producers, having already made 
their production decisions, decide on the proportion of their planned production they want to sell 
under contract.  Likewise, the processors, also having already made their production decisions, 
decide on the proportion of the raw product they want to purchase under contract. The first stage 
is a static optimization problem set up using Buccola’s decisions-under-risk model for a fixed-
price contract case (Buccola, 1981). They do this by maximizing the values of their respective 
certainty equivalents for profits given their utility functions. Subsequently, in a second stage, we 
use the residual supply to derive the spot market price using a conjectural variations model.  
 
Producers and processors marketing decision 
Producers’ problem 
Producers are many and each has attributes that determine their choice to sell in one 
form of market as opposed to the other. Following Buccola’s (1981) decisions under risk model, 
consider a producer who plans to produce X units of a good and has the choice of selling some 
of these units under a marketing contract and some on the open market. Fixed-price contracts 
are typical because cattle feeders have the choice of contracting a portion of their cattle for a 
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fixed and known price over the period of the contract; the remainder can be sold afterwards at 
the prevailing market price, which at the decision time is a random and unknown variable. The 
per-unit contract price received is kB which is a function of the per-unit variable cost B (a 
random variable) of production and some positive factor (k). Both B and k are constant in a 
fixed-price contract; and therefore have a variance of zero. Defining M as the spot market price 
and V as the proportion of X sold under contract given 10 ≤≤ V , C as the per unit variable cost, 
and F as per-unit fixed costs, seller profit πs is: 
 
(1) ( )[ ]FCMVVkBXs −−−+= 1pi  
 
Following Buccola, the negative exponential utility function λpieU −=
’
0>λ , with 
constant risk aversion coefficient λ is used in this analysis. Assuming that the returns are 
normally distributed, the negative exponential utility may be maximized explicitly by 
maximizing the producer’s certainty equivalent of risky prospects Z: 
 
(2) )var()2/()( pipipi −= sEZ  if 0>λ . 
 
The certainty equivalent of risky prospects is the guaranteed payoff at which the 
producer is "indifferent" between accepting the guaranteed payoff and a higher but uncertain 
payoff. Below, expected values are denoted by E, variances and covariances by S. Assuming the 
variance of fixed costs F is zero, the general certainty equivalent Z of risky prospect is: 
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Esm is the expected spot market price, Esc is the expected variable cost of production, Ebk 
is the fixed-price of contract, Sm2 is the spot market price variance, Sc2 is the variance of the 
variable production cost, Smc is the covariance between the spot market price and the variable 
cost of production, Sbm is the covariance between constant b and the spot market price, Sbc is the 
covariance between the constant b and the variable cost of production. All else is previously 
defined.  
As per Buccola, the optimal contract proportion V* at which certainty equivalent Z 
reaches an extreme value for a fixed-price contract is: 
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where 1*0 << V .  
The producer maximizes her expected utility by selling V*X under the contract and (1-
V*)X in the open market. The responsiveness of V* to different values of λ and Ebk provides 
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interesting insights into the behavior of the contract supply curve. The impact of a marginal 
increase in the fixed-price on the optimally contracted proportion is 2
1
)(
*
mb XSkE
V
λ
=
∂
∂
, positive 
and invariant with respect to the fixed-price level. Similarly, the impact of increased risk 
aversion on the optimally contracted proportion is 22
*
m
bsm
XS
kEEV
λλ
−
=
∂
∂
. This term has an 
ambiguous sign: where k<Esm/Eb, V* rises with increasing λ; where k>Esm/Eb, V* falls with 
increasing λ. The term is equal to zero where k=Esm/Eb. Also, note that V* increases with the 
spot market price variance 2mS   and decreases with the covariance between the spot market price 
and the per-unit variable cost of production Smc. 
 
Processors’ problem 
Now, following Buccola’s buyer situation, the processor wishes to buy A units of cattle 
slaughter and pack for re-sale. The contract and open markets are both available to the buyer as 
well. Buyers are assumed to be perfectly competitive in the output market and receive a per-unit 
resale price R, D and G are respectively the per-unit processing and fixed costs , W as the 
proportion of cattle purchased through contract, and all other variables as previously defined. 
The buyer’s profit function is as follows: 
 
(5) ( )[ ]GDMWWkBRAb −−−−−= 1pi  
 
where 10 ≤≤ W
.
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In a fixed-price contract, if prices and returns are normally distributed and the buyer has an 
exponential profit utility with absolute risk-aversion coefficientγ , the certainty equivalent Y is 
maximized: 
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Smd is the covariance between the open market price of the raw product and the processing 
cost, and Smr is the covariance between the raw product price and the finished market price. The 
portfolio proportion W* at which the processor’s certainty equivalent Y, and thus expected utility, 
reach an extreme value is: 
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The impact on the optimal contracted proportion W* with respect to the contract price Ebk is
2
1*
mb ASkE
W
γ
−
=
∂
∂
. This shows that the buyer’s demand for fixed-price purchases tends toward 
becoming perfectly inelastic with respect to changes in the fixed-price as the absolute risk-aversion 
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coefficient, the total quantity sought for purchase, or the perceived variance of spot market prices 
becomes large. Note that when the risk aversion coefficients and the total quantities of buyer and 
seller are identical, slopes of the supply and demand curves are equal and opposite in sign. 
 
Equilibrium in the contract market  
As per Buccola, if producers and processors have equal bargaining power and identical 
subjective probability distributions of revenues and costs, equilibrium is reached in the fixed-price 
contract market when V* from Equation (4) equals W* from Equation (7): 
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The equilibrium fixed contract price Ebke is less than the expected market price Em if the 
covariance between raw product and finished product market prices Smr is algebraically greater 
than the sum (Smd+Smc) of covariances between raw product market price and production costs. 
The equilibrium fixed price depends on the magnitudes of Smr and (Smd+Smc) as well as on the 
ratio γ/λ. 
Now we extend the Buccola model by considering the case where processors and 
producers do not have equal bargaining power in the contract market.  To model imperfect 
competition in the contract market, we first solve for the monopsonistic solution, under which the 
processor sets the terms, and that represents one extreme. We use the equal bargaining solution 
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for the other extreme; this corresponds to the intersection of the V* and W* derived above as 
Ebke.  Alternatively, we could derive the contract price in the situation that the producer sets the 
terms making the monopolistic solution the other extreme, but this option is not very likely for 
the case of the cattle industry1. Thus, we define the various linear combinations between the 
contract price in the perfectly competitive solution and the price in the monopsonistic solution as 
representing various degrees of market power.  
In the monopsonistic solution, the proportion demanded W* is determined by the 
intersection of the marginal factor cost (MFC) function and the demand (W*) function.  The 
expected contract price Ebkm is determined from the supply (V*) function in the same manner as 
the input price is determined in the standard monopsony model.   
Given
*
*)(
**)(
dV
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m
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1
 Another problem with using the situation in which the producer possesses all the market power is that both the producer-dominant and 
processor-dominant solutions result in a reduction in the quantity, or proportion, contracted.  In either a monopsony or a monopoly case, the firm 
with all the bargaining power restricts output to increase its profits, but they dictate the price from different curves (either the marginal revenue 
curve or the marginal factor cost curve).  Therefore, if we were to define those two solutions as the extreme solutions, it would be difficult to 
create a range of prices or quantities that would indicate an increase or decrease in bargaining power because the movement would be non-linear.   
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We solve for Ebk(W*) from equation (7) and get
( ) 

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mmb S
SSWASEWkE γ . Setting Ebk(W*) equal to the MFC, we solve for 
the corresponding proportion contracted in a monopsony case, *mW . 
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The actual contract price is read from the supply function as in the standard monopsony 
model.  We substitute *mW   into the Ebk(V*) to determine the monopsony contract price .b mE k    
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Ultimately, the expected contract price kEb is the weighted average of the price under the 
assumption that there is equal bargaining power ( b eE k ) and the price under the assumption that 
processor is able to set the price ( b mE k ), where ( ) ebmbb kEkEkE θθ −+= 1  and 10 ≤≤ θ . Hence, θ 
represents the degree of bargaining power held by the processor.  If the processor does not have 
superior bargaining power, θ=0 and the Buccola solution prevails.  However, if θ>0, the 
processor possesses some degree of bargaining power and as θ increases the solution tends 
toward the monopsony solution, which holds if θ=1.  
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Deriving equilibrium in the spot market: the oligopsony case  
The oligopsony power enjoyed by the buyers in the open market is revealed in a second 
stage. At this point, processors have fixed amount of cattle contracted and an upward sloping 
residual supply of cattle available to them as was determined in a first stage. In this second 
stage, the processor determines how much of the raw product to purchase in the spot market to 
reach the optimal quantity for processing. This will depend on the price she expects to receive in 
the processed product market, R. The price for the raw product in the open market is determined 
by the behavior of the processors in the cash market during the second stage. The processing 
industry has n firms producing a homogenous product, beef. We assume a fixed-proportions 
production technology such that ii XA τ= where we normalize by setting 1=τ , so ii XA = . 
Using a conjectural variation model, we derive an expression for the representative processor i’s 
market power who maximizes profit πbi 
 
(12) GDmkBWxWMRA iiibi −−−−−= **)1(pi  
 
As W*=V* in equilibrium, we rewrite the expression as follows: 
 
(13) GDmkBVxVMRA iiibi −−−−−= **)1(pi  
 
given 
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The quantity of beef produced by processor i, Ai, is a function of the cattle supplied to her 
(xi) and the marketing input (mi). The marketing input is any input other than the raw cattle that 
goes into the processing stage (i.e. labor, capital, and others). Function f(xi,mi) is assumed to be 
smooth, concave, and twice and continuously differentiable in x. The production technology is 
assumed to be separable in the farm and marketing input m, in the sense that the marginal rate of 
technical substitution between contracted and spot market purchases of x is independent of m. The 
spot market price M is a function g of the total quantity supplied X and the proportion contracted 
V*. The terms x1, x2,..., xn are raw inputs bought by processor 1, processor 2, …, and processor n. 
The weighted average conjectural variation, or the degree of collusion, β is represented 
below in Equation (14). The weighted average conjectural variation is the sum of the conjectures of 
all n firms with respect to firm i.  
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The conjecture 
i
j
dx
dx
v =  indicates the representative processor’s expected change in the 
purchases of inputs by rival processor j given a change in the representative processor’s own 
purchases. We propose that v is identical for all i and j, then β and v simply equal as follows: 
 
(15) v=β  
 
We take the definition of the Composite Lerner Index, L, for the processors as the 
expression for their market power (Chen and Lent, 1992).  
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=
=
n
i
i XxH
1
22 / is the Herfindahl Index. The Lerner Index presented in equation (16) 
states that oligopsony power in the spot market is a function of the residual supply elasticity of the 
cattle input (εo), the weighted average conjectural variation (β) and the size of processing firms with 
relation to the industry which is an indicator of the amount of competition among them (H). We 
eliminate the negative sign that precedes the equation with the purpose of evaluating the absolute 
values of the term. L is equal to zero under perfect competition as n increases up to a critical mass. 
The impact of contracting on the spot market oligopsony power depends on the relative changes ε. 
In the next lines we shall reveal the impacts on the supply elasticity. 
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We now determine the equilibrium price and quantity in the spot market. The constant 
elasticity raw product supply is a function of some supply shifting constant s, the sport market price 
M, and the supply elasticity ε. The expression for the supply function prior to contracting is: 
(17) εsMX =  
The expression for the residual supply function in the second stage spot market is therefore: 
(18) osMXV ε=− *)1(  
As the supply shifts in the second stage, this study considers the case where the elasticity decreases 
as sellers face less marketing options at this stage. The residual spot market supply elasticity εo is 
assumed to be a linear decreasing function of ε as V* increases as follows: 
(19) ( )εφε *1 Vo −=  
where φ  is some value such that 10 ≤≤ φ . This simple formula ensures that as long as V*>0,
εε ≤o  even though the values that φ  can take are arbitrary. This means that contracting causes 
the spot market supply to exhibit a more inelastic response to price changes. In this case, lower 
supply elasticity in turn contributes to amplifying the degree of oligopsony power in the spot 
market. 
The expression for the spot market price is as follows:  
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We observe the spot market price M is negatively related to the proportion contracted V*. 
The slope of the supply curve is derived as follows: 
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Adaptive expectations in spot market price 
In this section, we determine the producer and processor respective expectations of the 
market price which conform to the adaptive expectations model frequently used in econometric 
analyses (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). In this model, the producers and processors form their 
expectations of the future market price based on the past prices.  In our application, the difference 
between the expected value of the per-unit market price ( t
mE ) and the expected value in the previous 
period ( 1−t
mE ) is assumed to be a proportion (α) of the difference between the actual value in the 
previous period ( 1−tM ) and the expected value in the previous period: 
 
(22) )( 111 −−− −=− tmttmtm EMEE α  where 10 ≤< α  
 
Terms αs and αb are the coefficients of expectations for producers and processors, 
respectively. We rewrite the relationship with subscripts s and b added for sellers and buyers 
respectively as follows: 
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(24) 11 )1( −− −+= tbmbtbtbm EME αα  
 
 
This states that the expected values of the market price for producers and processors, 
respectively, in the current period are weighted averages of the actual value in the previous period 
and the expected value in the previous period. Term Em differs between producers and processors as 
they do not necessarily place the same weights on past prices and past expectations. 
In the next chapter, we build a spreadsheet model with the adaptive expectations and the 
optimization results to further evaluate and produce insights on the general model by simulating 
the impacts of changes in key parameters on the variables under study. The parameters 
simulated are: (1) the coefficients of risk aversion for the processors (γ) and producers (λ); (2) 
the spot market price variance (Sm2); (3) the coefficients of expectations for the processors (αb) 
and producers (αs); (4) and the bargaining power weight (θ). 
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Chapter IV. Spreadsheet Model and Simulation Analyses  
The equilibrium that resulted from the producers’ and processors’ problems under the equal 
bargaining power case (θ=0), and the adaptive expectations framework in a spreadsheet to conduct 
simulations and sensitivity analyses on the key parameters just specified. We set the number of 
producers N at 100 and the number of processors n at 10. We set the processed beef price by 
adjusting to the 2008 retail value of choice beef of USD 438. Quantities supplied and demanded are 
normalized to 100 and proportions are easily viewed in percentage terms. Historical market prices 
for cattle are taken from actual gross farm values between 2003 and 2009 provided in the USDA 
Beef Price Database. And the current market price, Mt, is generated by the model through equation 
(22). We assume a constant-elasticity cattle supply curve which means that the elasticity does not 
vary along the supply curve. The supply elasticity changes as the curve shifts after the contractual 
transactions.  
We set variable costs at 50 and fixed costs at 100. We also used the historical prices to 
determine the spot market price variance ( 2mS ). The coefficients of expectations, αb and αs, are fixed 
at 0.5 for 4 of the simulations; this places equal weights on the historical prices and historical 
expectations. The coefficient of risk aversion for producers (λ) and processors (γ) are set to 1 but are 
allowed to vary for the purpose of the first simulation analysis. Finally, we arbitrarily set 
covariances Smr, Smc and Smd at 400, 200 and 200, respectively. All the variables are determined in 
the model as presented by equations (1), (4), (5), (7), (8), (10), (11), (14), (17), (18), (19), (20), (23), 
and (24).  
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Simulations with the coefficient of risk aversion 
The first simulation consists in evaluating the coefficient of risk aversion (λ) to see what 
could occur to our model results when we consider different risk aversion for our sellers and buyers. 
The risk effects are evaluated by varying the coefficient of risk aversion for producers and then for 
processors between the ranges of measurement of 0.001 (low risk aversion) and 2.0 (high risk 
aversion). For the purposes of these first sets of simulations, first we deviate from the equilibrium 
restriction so V* is no longer equal to W* and so we do not associate any implications with open 
market equilibrium; second we fix v=0 assuming a Cournot conjecture and the number of 
processors and producers n=10 and N=100, respectively; third we fix the coefficients of 
expectations αs=αb=0.5, the elasticity adjustment constant 06.0=φ and the supply shifting factor 
s=0.000001. We evaluate the coefficients of risk aversion for the cases where the equilibrium 
contract price is lower than the expected spot market price Ebk<Em as well as for the cases where the 
equilibrium contract price is higher than the expected spot market price Ebk>Em. The results for the 
producers and the processors are summarized in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.  
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Table 1: Summary of Risk Aversion Simulations for 
Producers 
  Ebk<Em  Ebk > Em 
λ V* W* M V* W* M 
0.001 0.3209 0.4938 198.11 0.5994 0.4936 185.50 
0.003 0.4361 0.4938 194.70 0.5289 0.4936 190.26 
0.005 0.4591 0.4938 193.76 0.5148 0.4936 191.05 
0.007 0.4690 0.4938 193.33 0.5088 0.4936 191.38 
0.009 0.4745 0.4938 193.08 0.5054 0.4936 191.56 
1.000 0.4935 0.4938 192.17 0.4938 0.4936 192.15 
2.000 0.4936 0.4938 192.16 0.4937 0.4936 192.16 
 
Table 2: Summary of Risk Aversion Simulations for 
Processors 
  Ebk < Em Ebk > Em 
γ V* W* M V* W* M 
0.001 0.4935 0.6664 192.17 0.4938 0.3880 192.15 
0.003 0.4935 0.5513 192.17 0.4938 0.4584 192.15 
0.005 0.4935 0.5282 192.17 0.4938 0.4725 192.15 
0.007 0.4935 0.5183 192.17 0.4938 0.4786 192.15 
0.009 0.4935 0.5129 192.17 0.4938 0.4819 192.15 
1.000 0.4935 0.4938 192.17 0.4938 0.4936 192.15 
2.000 0.4935 0.4937 192.17 0.4938 0.4936 192.15 
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In Table 1, having fixed γ=1, we observe that when Ebk<Em, increases in the feeders’ 
coefficient of risk aversion, λ, causes their their optimal share of cattle marketed through 
contracts to increase and hence contributes to increasing the spot market supply elasticity and 
hence the Lerner Index. The spot market price, M, decreases accordingly. On the other hand, 
when Ebk>Em, increases in λ, decreases the feeders’ optimal share of cattle marketed through 
contracts and hence contributes to increasing the spot market price.   
Thus, we observe that the influence of feeders’ relative degree of risk aversion on 
packers conduct depends on their expectations of the future market price. In the case of the 
packers, in Table 2, holding λ=1, we observe that although packers’ market power is affected by 
feeders’ relative degree of risk aversion, this is not true with respect to their own risk aversion. 
From our model, the explanation for this is evident in the derivation of oligopsony power as the 
optimization problem is set up subject to the quantity supplied (1-V*)X; so changes in W* have 
no effect on  εo.  
In the rest of the simulations, we keep the same values that were previously assigned for 
the different parameters and constants; we only make changes in the parameter in question. 
 
Simulations with the spot market price variance 
The purpose here is to assess how the spot market price is affected by the spot market 
price variance. Our simulation confirms a downward linear association between Sm2 and M as 
increases in the variance induces an increase in the equilibrium contracted proportions due to 
higher perceived risk in the spot market. This implies the possibilities of a future increasing 
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trend in the use of contracts in cattle procurement as the prices of these commodities become 
more volatile as well as a decreasing trend in the price offered in the spot market. 
 
Sensitivity analysis with the coefficient of expectations 
To verify how the model behaves according to our assumption of the coefficients of 
expectations, we conduct a sensitivity analysis by varying the value we give to αs and αb in the 
spreadsheet. The results are summarized below in Table 3 for producers and processors, 
respectively. We note that the coefficient only affects our estimations for the expected open market 
price (Em) and hence the equilibrium contracted price (Ebk). These in turn have implications for the 
profits that producers and processors receive. However, we observe these coefficients do not have 
any significant effect on the shares contracted as Ebke closely follows Em. Therefore, the spot market 
supply elasticity and market power are not very responsive.  
Table 3: Sensitivity analysis of the Coefficients of 
Expectations 
αs Esm Ebk M αb Ebm Ebk M 
0.10 200.43 203.63 192.15 0.10 200.43 203.63 192.16 
0.30 210.67 208.75 192.16 0.30 210.67 208.75 192.16 
0.50 206.82 206.82 192.16 0.50 206.82 206.82 192.16 
0.70 202.72 204.77 192.16 0.70 202.72 204.77 192.16 
0.90 200.42 203.62 192.15 0.90 200.42 203.62 192.16 
 
Simulations with contract market bargaining weights 
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In this last simulation, we evaluate the outcomes of different bargaining for processors. 
By examining changes in the different degrees of bargaining power θ, we observe that increases 
in the processors’ bargaining power induces increases the processors’ demand for contracts but 
decreases the producers’ supply of contracts. This affects the two markets through declining 
contract prices and increasing spot market prices.  
 
Table 4: Summary of Simulations on 
Contract Market Bargaining Weights 
ϕ V* W* Ebk M 
0 0.4937 0.4937 206.82 192.16 
0.10 0.4772 0.5101 206.17 192.95 
0.30 0.4443 0.5430 204.87 194.38 
0.50 0.4114 0.5759 203.57 195.61 
0.70 0.3785 0.6088 202.28 196.66 
0.90 0.3456 0.6418 200.98 197.55 
1 0.3291 0.6582 200.33 197.93 
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Chapter V. A Dynamic Case with a Marketing Agreement  
We have accomplished our first objective of setting up a case where expectations 
derived from past experiences can contribute to the decisions of profit maximizing producers 
and processors under risk. In this section, we discuss the dynamic aspects of contracts as we 
know that the most prominent type of contract used in the procurement of livestock is a 
marketing agreement in which a packer and a feeder agree to purchase/sell livestock through a 
long-term ongoing oral or written arrangement with specific terms (Taylor et al., 2007). A 
typical marketing agreement for cattle runs for four to seven years and consists of multiple 
transactions in each. In the longer run, X, A, Ebk can all change and create additional 
uncertainties in the producers and processors’ problems and in achieving equilibrium. Now, we 
briefly evaluate the feeder’s decision making process in entering a marketing agreement. 
Consider a marketing agreement with one transaction in each period. Given the long 
biological cycle of beef and high capital needs, it is safe to keep X and A fixed for the duration 
of the agreement. If we assume a fixed contract pricing strategy that only changes to include 
quality premium/discounts in the same manner as in the open market, we are also safe to keep 
Ebk locked for the life of the contract. Given the previously derived variances, we know V* and 
W*; now we wish to establish the process in which our upstream agents, the cattle feeders, make 
their decisions to enter in a long term agreement given the spot market and its opportunities and 
uncertainties.  
Deciding whether or not to enter into a contract are based on the total present value of 
expected returns during the course of the periods. We define a few parameters and variables. 
The term t determines the periods of each transaction up to the last period T so that t=1, 2, ..., T. 
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The term pt is the probability at time t that kEE btm > ; δ is a very small but significant value so 
that kEE btm > is transformed into δ+= kEE btm and kEE btm < is transformed into
δ−= kEE btm . Finally r is a time discount factor. As per the decision tree mechanism in Figure 
2, we assume a binding contract so that although there is the possibility to choose to contract in 
any period, once the decision to contract is made, it will bind for at least T more periods.  
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Figure 2: Cattle Feeders Decision Tree 
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As the motivation here is for hedging purposes, the optimization problems for one unit 
take the following form, in which we solve for an average pt at which the feeder is indifferent 
between the two marketing options such that discounted contracted values of one unit of cattle 
are equal to the discounted expected market values of one unit of cattle:  
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From Equation (25), we deduce that the indifference point between the two markets is 
where the average probability atp of receiving an expected market price higher than the 
equilibrium contract price equals to 0.5. This brief exercise has enabled us to understand that a 
cattle feeder will decide to contract if she ex ante places a less than 50% chance that, on 
average, future market prices will be slightly lower than the offered contract price. 
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Chapter VI. Conclusions  
In this paper, we show a case where the choice of marketing for buyers and sellers is 
regarded as part of the optimization problem. Through a model of decisions under risk, 
producers (cattle feeders) and processors (beef packers) reach equilibrium contracted 
proportions and a fixed contract price. We extend this model to also consider cases of unequal 
bargaining power between producers and processors. In a second stage, these proportions as 
well as market expectations have real implications for the spot market. In addition to risk 
mitigation purposes, cattle feeders and meat packers engage in marketing agreements for several 
other reasons such as quantity and quality assurance, information and market access, and 
efficiency.  
We find that the practice of fixed-price contracts can serve to reduce the spot market 
price. Hence, the processor enjoys higher oligopsony power in the spot market. Although, 
noncompetitive conduct is not a necessary condition for the inverse relationship between the 
spot market price and the degree of vertical coordination, contracts may have the ability to 
reduce the subsequent spot market price if the residual supply elasticity is reduced by the shift. 
We run simulations in a spreadsheet model to derive further insights about key 
parameters, including the risk aversion coefficients, the spot market price variance, the 
coefficient of expectations, and the bargaining power weights in the contract market. We 
observe that when the spot market price is expected to be higher than the equilibrium fixed 
contract price, increases in the producer’s coefficient of risk aversion cause their optimal share 
of cattle marketed through contracts to increase and hence it contributes to a higher spot market 
price. On the other hand, when the expected market price is lower than the equilibrium 
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contracted price, increases in the producer’s coefficient of risk aversion decreases the producers’ 
optimal share of cattle marketed through contracts and hence contributes to higher spot market 
prices. These two results are due to the fact that increasing risk aversion decreases the sensitivity 
with which optimal portfolios react to changes in the price parameters. By simulating increasing 
(decreasing) spot market price variance, we observe the equilibrium contracted proportions to 
increase (decrease) accordingly. In turn, this causes a lower (higher) spot market price. The 
simulations on the degree of the processors’ bargaining power in the contract market show that 
increases in the processors’ bargaining power induces higher demand for contracts by 
processors and lower supply of contracts by producers. This results in a decline in the contract 
price and an increase in the spot market price.  
Finally, a brief exercise in dynamic decision making reveals that a producer will always 
choose to contract out a proportion of their cattle as long as they are less than 50% certain that, 
on average, future market prices will be slightly lower than the offered contract price. 
We recognize that other attributes ought to be considered in evaluating the impacts of 
contractual agreements. We propose an empirical extension to determine the main motives that 
drive contractual agreements in cattle marketing and their respective significance on the spot 
market structure. We have established that both upstream and downstream agents are motivated 
to diversify their transactions between a more certain present and an uncertain future in the view 
of maximizing their profits and utilities given their respective degrees of risk aversion. In our 
theoretical model, the equilibrium share of contracts (V* and W*) is close to 50%. In practice, 
this share is about 38%. There are factors other than risk that contribute to the decision making 
of cattle feeders and meat packers. The empirical study would no longer have a representative 
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producer and a representative packer but instead have different ones each with a unique 
portfolio in each period. Some are totally independent and transact only in the cash market; 
some transact only in the contract market; and some allocate their cattle between the two 
markets. In this, we could explain and measure the extent to which risk aversion and other 
factors such as size, quality, location, capital and conduct impact the proportions contracted and 
the spot market price. Additionally, the empirical analysis could involve estimating the residual 
supply elasticity and separate the market power effects.  
A factor that is frequently cited as a motivation to contract on the processors side is the 
case of noncompetitive conduct. A popular example is that of obscure pricing. Obscure pricing 
occurs when one party manipulates the market such that the price that is offered to one is hidden 
to the others. This practice can be effectively controlled by enforcing legislation such as the 
Mandatory Price Reporting Act passed by Congress in 1999 and implemented in 2001 which 
mandates reporting of transaction data only by beef packers who slaughter an average of 
125,000 cattle (Azzam, 2003). The Captive Supply Reform Act proposes to amend the Packers 
and Stockyards Act of 1921, to prohibit the use of certain anti-competitive forward contracts. 
This measure would require that supply contracts and agreements between packers and livestock 
producers include fixed-price formulas and that these arrangements be conducted in the open.  
In this paper, the same fixed-price contract is available to both parties. This implies that 
the same pricing information and competitive conditions are available to all parties. However, in 
practice, many contracts are established in a case-by-case basis; from one-sided deals offered by 
large packers to negotiated deals in which terms are reached in an extensive bargaining process. 
We propose an extension to this paper that takes into account different producer and processor 
46 
 
 
types (different degrees of bargaining power) engaging in a bargaining process over the price of 
the contract. This should result in multiple equilibriums of proportions contracted and of 
contract prices with different implications on the spot market.
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